Operations According to the War Department organization in place at the end of 1941, the Hawaiian Department of the Army had responsibility for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. It reported directly to the War Department and was the highest Army command in the Pacific. Major subordinate commands under the Hawaiian Department included the Hawaiian Air Force and the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions. Although both divisions would play prominent roles in the Pacific war and were part of Hawaii's defenses during the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not actually participate in the ground combat in the Central Pacific. Operations Plan RAINBOW 5 outlined a joint Army-Navy mission to defend the island of Oahu, site of the Navy's Pearl Harbor base and the Army's Wheeler and Hickam Airfields. The plan specifically charged the Army's Hawaiian Department with defending Oahu against attack; protecting against sabotage and other internal strife; supporting naval forces in the protection of Allied sea lines of communications; and conducting offensive operations against Axis sea lines of communications within the tactical operating radius of all American air bases. To implement these responsibilities the Hawaiian Department developed three stages of alert. The department was at the lowest stage of alert—Alert 1, defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities—when the Japanese planes from a naval task force standing 200 miles north of Oahu launched the attack on Hawaii. The Japanese assault took place between 0750 and 1000, bombing the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which, except for the carriers, was in its home port at Pearl Harbor near Honolulu. Of the 8 battleships moored neatly along battleship row, 3 were sunk, 1 capsized, and the other 4 were damaged. In addition serious damage occurred to 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, and a variety of other vessels. Army Air Forces planes, aligned in close formation at Hickam and Wheeler Airfields, also provided lucrative targets. Attacks on those facilities resulted in losses of 92 Navy and 96 Army planes. American casualties from the Japanese bombing totaled 2,280 killed and 1,109 wounded. Japanese losses were a comparatively insignificant 29 planes and 5 midget submarines. At the end of the first day of what would eventually be designated the Central Pacific Campaign, the United States had been dealt a stunning blow to its military and naval prowess. The Japanese, however, failed to administer the knockout punch. One of the first American reactions to the Pearl Harbor debacle was a major shakeup in the Pacific command structure. In a belated effort to achieve unity of command ten days after the Japanese attack, all Army units in the area, including the headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, were placed under the operational control of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. About the same time, the Pacific Fleet and the Hawaiian Department and its air force received new commanders. But reorganization and new faces at the top could not disguise the fact that the sudden arrival of war had left American war plans in serious disarray. With the Japanese on the offensive throughout the Pacific, the United States could do little but watch as Allied strongpoints fell one by one: Wake Island was overwhelmed on 23 December 1941; the British garrison at Hong Kong surrendered on Christmas Day; British North Borneo surrendered on 19 January 1942, the surrender of Singapore signaled the end of the Malayan battle on 15 February; and Japanese forces landed virtually unopposed on Dutch New Guinea on 1 April. With the fall of the Philippines on 6 May, the Japanese seriously threatened to achieve their goal of dominating the Pacific basin. During the Japanese advance, British and American leaders met in Washington to discuss a combined war strategy. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and their military advisers were in general agreement on how to conduct the war, and the Arcadia Conference, held in Washington from 24 December 1941 to 14 January 1942, was the first of many such sessions where the Allies considered global strategy at the highest political and military levels. Among the major decisions reached at this conference—one that would directly affect the conduct of the Central Pacific Campaign— was confirmation at the highest level that the focus of the Allied war effort would initially be Germany, while the Pacific would remain on the strategic defensive as an economy-of-force theater. On 24 March the new British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a directive designating the Pacific theater an area of U.S. strategic responsibility. Six days later the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) divided the Pacific theater into three areas: the Pacific Ocean Area, the Southwest Pacific Area, and the Southeast Pacific Area. The Joint Chiefs further divided the Pacific Ocean Area (POA), which included the Hawaiian Islands, into the North, Central, and South Pacific Areas. They designated Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPOA), with operational control over all units (air, land, and sea) in that area. Nimitz in turn designated subordinate commanders for the North and South Pacific Areas but retained the Central Pacific Area, including the Hawaiian Department, under his direct command. In the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), General Douglas MacArthur assumed command, but no commander was named for the Southeast Pacific Area. The effective result of this organizational scheme was the creation of two separate commands in the Pacific (POA and SWPA), each reporting separately to the Joint Chiefs, each competing for scarce resources in an economy-of-force theater, and each headed by a commander in chief (CINC) from a different service. Although the directives to Nimitz and MacArthur were generally alike, there were some fundamental differences. Nimitz was allowed to command naval and land forces in the Pacific Ocean Area directly, while MacArthur was enjoined to act through subordinate commands in the Southwest Pacific Area. The tasks assigned to each commander also differed significantly. MacArthur's assigned mission was essentially defensive, since he was told only to "prepare for the offensive" while defending Australia. Nimitz, while clearly having a defensive mission in the context of the overall economy-of-force role of the Pacific theater, was also instructed to "prepare for the execution of major amphibious offensives." The directive to Nimitz further specified that the initial offensives would be launched from the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, thus implying that Nimitz would command offensives in MacArthur's area of command. As a result of this somewhat muddled command arrangement, much of the two-year Central Pacific Campaign was marked not by battle with Japan over control of the Pacific but by debates among Nimitz, MacArthur, and the JCS over control of American strategy and forces in the Pacific. Continued Central Pacific, Page 3 Copyright 2006 nopukob.com