The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was both a strategic and a political blunder. Japanese pilots not only failed to destroy the U.S. Navy's most lethal weapons, its aircraft carriers, but they also united the American people behind an Allied war effort that would lead to the defeat of military dictatorships on two continents. The United States took a year after Pearl Harbor to arm and equip its forces before beginning sustained offensive operations in the Pacific. While formally supporting a plan to give priority to the war in Europe, the "Germany-first" policy, America nevertheless dispatched sufficient men and equipment to the Pacific in 1942 to halt the Japanese juggernaut. By the opening months of 1943 the U.S. Army and Marine Corps had fought and defeated the Imperial Japanese Army at Guadalcanal and, with the Australians, at Papua, New Guinea. At sea the U.S. Navy, although suffering heavy losses, had forced back the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway and in the waters around Guadalcanal, throwing it on the defensive. By mid-1943, U.S. political and military planners were developing the plans that would carry Allied military might to the heart of the Japanese Empire. The primary American commanders in the Pacific developed different strategic concepts for pursuing the war against Japan. General Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief of the Southwest Pacific Area, wanted to advance toward Japan along a New Guinea-Philippines axis. He reasoned that his concept would shield Australia from attack, make the best use of existing bases, and provide land-based support throughout most of the advance. MacArthur also hoped to isolate and bypass several well-fortified enemy bastions, as well as to fulfill his pledge to return to the Philippine Islands. Critics argued that his plan depended on a long and vulnerable supply line, was predictable and therefore subject to heavy resistance, and offered no decisive strategic results. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, wanted to thrust west from Hawaii, using sea power and carrier-based aircraft to seize isolated Japanese islands that could not be easily reinforced by the enemy. Once such footholds were secure, he would carry the war directly to the Japanese homeland. His critics noted the danger of ignoring Australia as well as the difficulties of operating across extended ocean areas without land-based aircraft. Since both plans appeared feasible, Allied military and political leaders debated the merits of each for many months. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) unveiled their "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan" during the Anglo-American Washington Conference in May 1943. As a result of these deliberations, Nimitz was directed to conduct the primary campaign, following the shorter, more direct approach to Japan that he had advocated. MacArthur was ordered to conduct a secondary, or supporting, campaign that would both complement Nimitz's effort and keep pressure on the Japanese across a wide expanse of territory. Although frequently modified during its existence, the JCS plan provided the blueprint for defeating the Japanese Empire in the Pacific. Continued Eastern Mandates page 2 Copyright 2006 nopukob.com