Strategic Setting One of the island groups targeted for invasion in the Joint Chiefs' plan was the Eastern Mandates, better known as the Marshall Islands. Under German control from the late 1890s through the end of World War I, the Marshalls had been assigned to the Japanese as mandates in accord with Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter. The Marshalls lie in two roughly parallel chains about 100 miles apart. The eastern, or "sunrise," chain contains the large atolls of Mille, Maloelap, and Wotje. The western, or "sunset," chain includes Jaluit, Kwajalein, Rongelap, Bikini, and Eniwetok. Both chains have numerous smaller atolls. An atoll normally consists of a perimeter of flat coral islands surrounded by reefs with a lagoon in the center. The lagoons are generally navigable since the coral reefs usually have breaks which permit seaborne traffic to enter and exit the atoll with comparative ease. There are 32 separate island groups in the Marshalls with 867 reefs, spread over 400,000 square miles of ocean. Kwajalein, the world's largest coral atoll, with over 90 islands, is located in the geographic center of the Marshalls and is approximately 2,100 nautical miles southwest of Pearl Harbor. The islands generally are narrow and flat and only two to three miles in length. Even the larger islands rise only about twenty feet above sea level. Although some of the small islands are barren, most have heavy undergrowth, and the larger ones also have coconut palms, breadfruit trees, and scrub pines. On most islands road networks were primitive or nonexistent in 1942, but one or more islands in each major group were large enough to accommodate an airstrip. Even prior to World War II the Japanese had constructed barracks, airfields, piers, and other military installations on many of the islands, and during 1942 and 1943 they were hard at work fortifying them further. Faced with conducting operations across vast stretches of water on mostly unimproved islands, Admiral Nimitz developed an operational concept of seizing one island chain to support operations in the next chain. Before attacking the Marshall Islands, Nimitz's forces therefore had seized Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert Islands, some 565 nautical miles south of the Marshalls, in November 1943. The U.S. Army's 27th Infantry Division had secured Makin against only light Japanese resistance, but the U.S. 2d Marine Division took strongly fortified and defended Tarawa only after suffering some of the heaviest American casualty rates of the war. The seizure of the Gilberts, especially the invasion of Tarawa, marked the first time an American force had assaulted a heavily fortified enemy beachhead from the sea, and despite sound amphibious doctrine, problems were apparent. Instances of inadequate air support due to poor communications and coordination, ineffective naval gunfire especially during the preinvasion bombardments, and inadequate quantities of equipment and materiel, as well as a shortage of amphibian tractors, all cost lives and demanded immediate solutions for the rest of the campaign. However, the landings, especially those at Tarawa, showed that the U.S. Navy and amphibious forces were capable of securing such isolated outposts with relative speed despite strong opposition. The U.S. victories at Tarawa and Makin achieved the mission of reducing the distance aircraft would have to travel to reach the Marshalls. U.S. warplanes could now conduct and carry out combat and photographic missions deep within enemy territory. Without that advantage, the campaign against the Marshalls, Operation Flintlock, would have been much more difficult and costly. Continued Eastern Mandates page 3 Copyright 2006 nopukob.com