Western Pacific 15 June 1944-2 September 1945 By the summer of 1944 American forces in the Pacific had established two routes of attack in their drive toward Japan. In the Central Pacific Navy and Marine Corps units, with Army assistance, were "island-hopping" westward from Hawaii, taking the Gilbert Islands in a costly campaign in November 1943 and the Marshall Islands in January-February 1944. In the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, Army units, with Navy and Marine Corps support, had taken Guadalcanal and Bougainville in 1942-43 and, operating with Australian forces, had cleared northeast New Guinea and the Hollandia area of Netherlands New Guinea by May 1944. These victories brought American forces to the inner defense line of the Japanese Empire. In deciding where to breach that line, the Allies looked for a place that would not only puncture Japanese confidence but provide anchorages for naval support of subsequent operations and air bases for strikes against enemy industrial and military installations. The best islands for these purposes lay in the Western Pacific: the Marianas and the Palaus. Strategic Setting When United States Army and Navy forces began pushing west into the Pacific after the disaster at Pearl Harbor, they had their ultimate objective, the Japanese home islands, clearly in mind. However, they lacked any detailed list of preliminary objectives that would bring them to the enemy's shores. Each island victory raised anew the question of the next intermediate goal. By the summer of 1944 the Allies faced a number of choices in the Pacific. They could continue directly west from Hawaii on a Central Pacific thrust that had just won them the Marshall Islands. They could continue toward the Philippines on a Southwest Pacific course that had recently won New Guinea. Or they could continue operations along both of these axes simultaneously. During 1943 influential personalities in the U.S. Army and Navy lined up behind different strategies for the Pacific. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, favored focusing Allied efforts against Japan in a thrust westward from Hawaii. Seconded by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas and Pacific Fleet, King argued that his Central Pacific strategy also represented the most direct route to the Philippines and would, at the same time, place American forces on the enemy line of communications between Japan and the oil-rich East Indies. King repeated his Central Pacific proposal at the Trident Conference in Washington in May, but it was neither approved nor rejected. See Map: The Pacific and Adjacent Theaters King's major opponent was General Douglas MacArthur, the Allied Southwest Pacific theater commander. MacArthur agreed on the need to return to the Philippines but not via the Marshalls and Marianas. Instead, he proposed a Southwest Pacific strategy: an extension of his own command's operations in New Guinea, which would push Allied forces westward through Morotai and then northward into the Philippines. A series of Allied planning conferences in 1943 failed to resolve the issue. The strong identification of each strategy with a different military service—Central Pacific with the U.S. Navy and Southwest Pacific with the U.S. Army—tended to undermine an unbiased appraisal of either course-of action and to encourage the potentially dangerous pursuit of both with inadequate resources. Finally, toward the end of 1943, a technological development began to influence the issue. The Army Air Forces announced the imminent appearance of a new long-range bomber, the B-29. The new weapon strengthened the Central Pacific strategy, since the island chain particularly desired by Admiral King—the Marianas—lay 1,270 miles from Tokyo, comfortably within the l,500-mile radius of the new aircraft. At the second Cairo Conference in December 1943 the Allies thus approved seizure of the Marianas, tentatively scheduled for October 1944. Subsequent operations along this axis would include seizure of the Palaus to secure the flank for the turn northwest into the Philippines. Although these decisions gave priority to the Central Pacific strategy, they did not amount to a rejection of MacArthur's Southwest Pacific proposals. In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed in March 1944 that the advance toward Japan would continue on both the Central and Southwest Pacific axes. At the same time, unexpectedly rapid success in the Marshalls allowed planners to advance the assault on the Marianas from October to June. Continued Western Pacific, Page 2 Copyright 2006 nopukob.com