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Truk's Last Hurrah
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With the devastating attacks on Truk by Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 58 in February and April 1944, and the almost daily bombing runs on Truk after the recapture of the Marianas, Truk was a forgotten Japanese outpost. But the island figured in on one last, desperate move by the Japanese.
In July 1945, with Admiral Halsey beginning his carrier attacks on the Japanese homeland, Captain T. Ariizumi, the commander of Submarine Division One, proposed a plan to try and delay or cripple the Amerian attacks on the Japanese homeland.
The Japanese were running low on submarines and were having difficulty completing the ones they had under construction. But before the fall of the Third Reich, Germany had given the Japanese their latest submarine technology. So by the spring of 1945, the Imperial Japanese Navy had the boats I-402, I-13, and I-14. These three subs were joined by the I-400. The Japanese now had the four largest submarines in the world, developed as underwater aircraft carriers. Each submarine carried a number of low-winged monoplanes called seiran, fitted with floats.
Capt. Ariizuma wanted to use the submarines to bomb the Panama Canal. He knew that with the fall of Germany, the American and British Atlantic fleets would be turned against the Japanese. He suggested that bombing the Panama Canal would delay the arrival of the Atlantic fleets in the Pacific for at least three months.
Capt. Ariizuma had full-scale model of the panama Canal locks built at the Maizuru navy yard and towed to Nanao Bay where the submarine crews and pilots were training.
(The following description of Capt. Ariizuma's plan is taken from CLOSING THE CIRCLE by Edwin P. Hoyt.)
An operational plan was authorized and a July date was established. The submarines would head eastward toward the Hawaiian Islands, then turn south and follow a line along 9 degrees north latitude, the position of the Panama Canal. Ten aircraft would be launched on X day, each carrying a 1,700-pound bomb or a Along-lance@ torpedo. Japanese intelligence assured Captain Ariizumi that there was nothing much to fear from the coastal defenses. Years earlier, the Americans had maintained a stout defense of the Caribbean and Panamanian waters, but following the defeat of Germany this had been relaxed sharply.
As Captain Ariizumi planned and prepared, his operation came under close scrutiny at Imperial General headquarters. No one doubted that it would strike a heavy blow at the United States, and the advocates of the plan said it would be the most effective blow possible under the circumstances, delivered with a minimal cost. But Panama was a long way away and Japan was having serious difficulty with the forces already in the Pacific theater. It seemed more important to the advocates of area warfare that a target be struck closer at hand. They suggested Ulithi, the forward American naval base. Captain Ariizumi's supporters argued that Ulithi was bound to be defended in force, while Panama was not. But the argument fell on deaf ears. The men who could seriously contemplate a war with civilians fighting tanks, flamethrowers, and napalm on the beaches of Japan could not be deterred by that sort of logic. The Panama plan was scrapped and the Ulithi orders were given.
Ariizumi then made his plans to strike Ulithi, and in July he set out for Truk. The once powerful Japanese naval base was still in Japanese hands, but only because Admirals Nimitz and King had decided, after the fall of the Marianas, that Truk was no longer important and need not be invaded. The Combined Fleet had long since deserted the island and nothing existed there except a few operational patrol boats, an occasional visiting submarine, and a harbor full of wrecks. The naval garrison at Truk was reduced to living off the land, and gunners and armorers now spoke about their taro patches and their coconuts and not about the weapons of war.
Captain Ariizumi set out personally in I-13 to command the operation. I-14 accompanied the flagship. I-400 and I-401 were to go to Ponape and await orders. From Truk, Captain Ariizumi would issue new directions for the final assault of Ulithi.
On the morning of July 16, an American search plane from the escort carrier Anzio spotted a Japanese submarine on the surface. The Anzio and its planes belonged to one of the new (to the pacific) hunter-killer teams of escort carriers plus destroyer escorts. The bomber attacked the submarine, which was I-13, and left it trailing oil. However, the I-boat managed to dive and get away. The oil trail, however, was followed by the plane and the curse and speed were given to the escorts Lawrence C. Taylor and Robert F. Keller. Soon they arrived on the general scene and were directed to the trail. Following the directions from still another plane that had taken over the watchman=s duties, the two destroyer escorts attacked. At 11:40 that morning the Lawrence C. Taylor launched an attack with another relatively new weapon, the hedgehog. This was a rocket-fired device that threw several depth charges in the water in a broad pattern that interlocked in area and depth. The Taylor launched several groups of charges and explosions were heard, including the heavy explosion made by a charge when it blew up against something solid. After a time, the destroyer escorts found debris floating on the surface and identified the submarine as I-13. So the Ulithi bombardment mission was leaderless. The I-14 managed without difficulty to reach Truk., and there unloaded the aircraft it had brought across the sea, and waited. But no word came, and I-14 remained at Truk, waiting. At about the same time Captain Ariizumi was fighting his last battle, I-400 and I-401 set out for a long journey to the Carolines to take station off Ponape and wait for word. They too stayed, waiting.
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