Reflections on Defeat

The single most shocking event for the people of the United States was the loathsome attack on Pearl Harbor, occurring as it did while peace talks were underway. Indeed, President Roosevelt had been advised of the attack on Pearl Harbor that Sunday morning in December 1941, only minutes before he was to meet with Ambassador to the U.S., Kichisaburo Nomura. Thirteen parts (referred to as "winds") of a fourteen-part message, sent from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador to Washington for delivery to President Roosevelt, had already been intercepted and decoded by the Magic machine. The U.S. knew that war was imminent, but it did not know precisely where in the Pacific the first attack would occur.

Almost four years later, when the subject of Pearl Harbor was brought up during the interrogations of senior Japanese naval officers at Truk after the war, Admiral Sumikawa remarked:

…the Imperial General Staff was the most obnoxious element of the government, because it was not responsive to any control except a nominal one in finance. Budgets had to have the help of the army and navy ministries to get money from the Diet through the cabinet, but otherwise the General Staff was in complete and irresponsible power, having direct access to the throne.

Admiral Hara stated:

The Prime minister, unless he were a soldier too, was likely to be by-passed and not know what was going on when the General Staff were "advising" the Emporer. For this reason, the Foreign Minister was sometimes forced to "go it blind," and dishonesty could thus be perpetrated by honest people….

There were those among us who thought as I did when we attacked Pearl Harbor. After the attack was definitely ordered, I thought "what can be the reason" for I never doubted the righteousness of the Emperor, though I was extremely concerned because the order did not any thinking that I knew to be right. I think you people were sometimes inept, though of course I see how you consider discrepancies between army dictated actions, and foreign office protestations as just rank dishonesty. The General Staff could control the government but not the "young" officers who did the Panay job and others.

Now you see why I am anxious not be to identified publicly with the things like this that I have said to you. I am talking this way because you have treated us kindly and have shown respect for our positions as naval officers. But I am still an officer on duty.

Rear Admiral M. Sumikawa would later state at Truk:

I admit we were lucky, but unfortunately that luck which made success so easy did harm to the

Japanese navy operations thereafter. It was too easy. And, another thing that was bad about that easy luck was that it made you angry. The speed of your manufacture was terrific which made it possible to counter-attack with overwhelming power.

Vice Admiral C. Hara then remarked:

We won a great tactical victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war. I thought this at the time but told no one. I understood the United States and believed that the fighting spirit of an individual in a democracy where each person has a part ib the government would rise in anger to build up a strong fighting force.

At this point Rear Admiral Sumikawa stated, "We were lucky at Pearl Harbor; we have been unlucky ever since. When the people of Japan heard the news, many were very happy but many more thought itwas a very serious matter.":

During this interrogation Rear Admiral Sumikawa observed,

If we had fought a show-down fight anywhere instead of allowing you to nibble and nibble at our fleet, the war's end might have been postponed for some time. We fell back until it was too late. The policy of the navy at the beginning of the war was based on the power of ships available and was sound. After the war started, the army dictated the policy and spread our available forces too thinly…. It was after this hit and run phase employed by the United States Navy that the fast Task Forces became a major factor in winning the war after the American Navy became powerful enough to conduct a sustained offensive. It seems that the victory at Midway and raids on Truk were the most effective.

When the number of your fast carriers increased and your offensive operations were undertaken, we were compelled to give up the Marianas, the Philippines, and Okinawa successively. The loss of the Marianas gave you a chance to launch incessant air raids against Japan, and the loss of the Philippines caused the stoppage of importation of important materials from southwestern Asia. The subsequent loss of Okinawa caused great difficulties in transportation of war materials from China and permitted air raids on Japan to increase in severity.

The defeat in the battle of Midway resulted in the loss of the backbone of our carrier groups. We lost both carriers and aviators, which it is believed, gave the opportunity for the successful invasion of the Solomons. If we had not lost our carrier groups in this battle, we would say we could have won back Guadalcanal. On the other hand, the damage given to us in Truk by the air raids of U.S. task forces on 16-17 February 1944 was a serious blow to Rebaul and Truk. This made it easy for the U.S. forces to occupy the Admiralty Islands and Eniwetok which served greatly as air bases. Before long, being attacked day after day by B-24's from these bases, the raison d'etre of Truk both as a fleet base and as a supply base for Rebaul was automatically lost. As a result, not only did it cause an isolation of Rebaul, but it also hastened your offensive against the Marianas. Furthermore, the loss of a good many ships fell heavily o our marine transportation.

At this point in the interrogation Rear Admiral Durgin stated,

One of my officers understood you to say earlier that the U.S. submarines were the greatest single factor contributing to the Japanese defeat, but later the B-24's and B-29's proved to be the most important contributors to American victory. If we understand you correctly, I wish you would go into more detail regarding this.

Admiral Sumikawa replied,

It is an undeniable fact that the activities of your submarines interrupted our marine transportation to a great degree, dealing a heavy blow to our capacity to carry on the war. At the same time the bombing effect of the B-24's and B-29's was also great, causing severe damage to our transport organization both on land and sea and various manufacturing establishments.

As a result, our capacity to wage war declined rapidly. If either of these operations had been

neglected, our war making capacity might not have fallen so rapidly. But the following things might possibly be said.

1. If we had not been attacked by U.S. submarines, we should have been able to have an abundant supply of defensive materials to use against B-24's and B-29's, and as a result we could have inflicted more damage upon you.

2. Further advance of B-24's and B-29's and the constant supply for them were made possible only by U.S. Navy's domination of the Pacific.

The quantity of necessities of life in our country is very small compared with that of America and the substitution of persons (Editor's note: Rotation of troops between outlying bases and home) was not carried on, so we didn't need so much shipping as you supposed. I think our shipping was much checked by the attacks of your submarines and it had a very great influence upon the progress of the war.

At this point the U.S. interrogator posed the question:

If we had concentrated more effort on building submarines and CV's instead of B-29's, do you think the war would have ended earlier?

Answer: The VC task forces gave decisive damage to local military facilities, sea force strikes at sea and submarines checked the communication and supply, but the B-29's operating from air bases occupied beforehand near our homeland give (sic) a shock to the national life and damage to materials. So I think the increase in CV's would have quickened the advancing operation much more.

Question: Do you believe the war could have ended without an invasion, that is using air power

alone?

Answer: B-29's alone could have not ended the war. If there had only been submarines, no landing on Japan proper and no B-29's, then there would be no prospect of ending the war. It is a combination of the submarines, task force, landing and the shock of the B-29's. Without a task force you could not have landed. The effect of the work of the B-29's is thanks to the carrier task forces.

Question: Do you think the war would have lasted much longer if we had not dropped the Atomic Bomb? How much longer?

Answer: I think it would have lasted much longer till the decisive battle in the Japanese homeland.

Question: Who in the government was responsible for the strategy that extended your lines so far to eastward beyond Truk, Guam and the Bonins?

Answer: The so called "Victory Disease" which came from the advantageous state at the beginning of the war, the false judgment that the American counter-attack would not be so strong and the fact that we could get surely the necessary material in the South, made us stretch spontaneously the lines of action so far to the eastward. We\can't say distinctly who was responsible. It will be better to say that it was because of the lack of well-informed persons.

Continued at Defeat2