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Japanese War Crimes Trial





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This article is taken in its entirety from
Ghost Fleet of the Truk Lagoon: An Account of "Operation Hailstone"

On May 10, 1944, a Far Eastern and Pacific Subcommittee was created as a branch of the United Nations' War Crimes Commission. Eleven nations participated in the Commission: Australia, Belgium, China, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Commission's composition, which was mainly legal and diplomatic, was not well adapted for the undertaking of administrative or executive tasks, and these duties devolved naturally on the authorities that exercised direct power over the ex-enemy countries: that is, on the Commander-in-Chief in the western countries. In the Far East, the International Military Tribunal was established by General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, by proclamation dated January 19, 1946.

Military commissions for the trial of war criminals in the Pacific were convened by the United States Navy at Kwajalein and Guam. The Office of the Director of War Crimes assembled information not only from the naval forces in the field, but from every known source, such as official battle reports, killed and missing-in-action reports, prisoner-of-war reports, statements from repatriated prisoners of war and from Trukese. War diaries, anonymous reports by individuals, Japanese deserters, United States Graves Registration Section, mutilated bodies of former Army and Navy personnel and a wide variety of other information sources were used to run down those believed to have been responsible for war crimes.

The task was made particularly difficult since some records were destroyed in the bombardment of Japanese installations. There is clear and indisputable evidence that the Japanese themselves engaged in a thorough and extensive program of destruction of all records potentially useful to the United States, with particular care given to the destruction of all records pertaining to prisoners-of-war and their treatment. One of the most elaborate and thorough plans for the concealment of war crimes was prepared by the Headquarters of the Japanese Fourth Fleet at Truk. A detailed fictitious prisoner-of-war report and an intricate strategy of deception was developed with primary and secondary retreat plans for concealment and limitation of information.

When American forces accepted the surrender of Truk, all appeared in order. Routine investigations revealed no leads as to any prisoner of war incidents. The matter was pursued through normal investigation and interrogation. After three months of investigation and the interrogation of thousands of Japanese and Trukese, not a single irregularity was discovered relative to the Japanese handling of American prisoners of war. Brigadier General Robert Blake, Commanding General of the Occupation Forces, was not satisfied. The General reasoned that since Truk was part of the South Pacific Forces and crimes were committed in other places, there must have been crimes committed in Truk.

All inquiries revealed the Japanese to be models of propriety in handling prisoners of war. It was Da Young Park, and American seaman of Korean descent, who proved otherwise. The labor battalions on Truk consisted on many Koreans, but when they were questioned by the Americans, no results were achieved. Da Young was thoroughly briefed and sent incognito during the night to the camps where the Koreans were living. He soon became acquainted with a Korean who told him he had heard of two Americans who had been bayoneted to death at the Japanese Fourth Fleet hospital. On the following day the Korean was taken to the American headquarters, where he related that immediately after the war te Japanese lined up everyone, Trukese and Japanese, who might know of atrocities and warned them of dire consequences if they should ever tell anything to the Americans. They were cajoled with brotherly love and loyalty to the Emperor. They were told that the Americans were weak and would not shoot them even though they might threaten them with a gun.

This Korean was treated with the greatest solicitude and was promised complete protection by the American investigators. Convinced of the sincerity of the Americans, he told of rumors that he had heard of American prisoners being bayoneted and beheaded by the Japanese on several occasions. He did not see any of the executions, but was able to give the names of Japanese who in all probability participated in the executions. The Japanese he named were immediately taken into custody and placed in a stockade that was visible for all to see. This gave rise to the belief that the Americans knew everything, and it also gave other Koreans and Trukese confidence that they could speak with the full protection of American forces.

After this opening wedge was made in the fabricated story developed by the Japanese high command at Truk, the revelation of the atrocities began to unfold. The long and arduous process of interrogating and re-interrogating hundreds of witnesses began. Every effort was made to check stories so as to limit responsibility to the ranking personnel directly performing the acts or their immediate commanding officers. Soon the true nature of the incidents was disclosed, and eventually adequate proof was collected to arrant the trial of numerous Japanese personnel responsible for the crimes. Evidence was collected on war crimes committed against ten Americans, twelve Nauruans, give Australians, one British, one French, one Swiss, four Trukese and thirteen white victims whose nationality could not be established.        

The accused were invariably afforded the western right of presumed innocence until proven guilty. Similarly, the burden of proof was on the prosecution, and the accused were given the benefit of the doctrine of “reasonable doubt.” None of the accused were tried in absentia. The accused were allowed the right or privilege against self-incrimination and were not required to take the stand to testify, nor was the failure to do so deemed of any evidentiary weight against them. The accused were afforded able defense counsel consisting of Japanese and American counsel of their own choice, and every effort was made to assist the accused through their counsel to obtain all relevant and material evidence and witnesses for their defense.

Continued on trial2